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ARTICLE
INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM: HOW CERTIFICATE OF NECESSITY
LAWS HARM OUR SOCIETY'S VALUES
TIMOTHY SANDEFUR*
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, college student entrepreneur Adam Sweet and his
brother co-founded a moving company called 2 Brothers Moving
in Portland, Oregon. What they did not know at the time was
that to get the mandatory state license, they would first be
required essentially to get permission from the state's existing
moving companies. Under a seventy-year-old state law,' when-
ever a person applied for a license, the Oregon Department of
Transportation ("ODOT") would notify existing movers of the
application and give them the opportunity to object to the issu-
ing of a license. Once the inevitable objection was filed, Sweet
would be forced to prove to ODOT that there was a "public
need" for a new moving company. The statute provided no defi-
nition of "public need"; nor did it set forth any standard of
review or evidentiary or procedural rules for such a determina-
tion. Instead, ODOT informally relied on a set of guidelines pre-
pared almost twenty years earlier by a different agency, the
Public Utility Commission, which described in general terms the
factors the Commission had previously considered when evaluat-
ing applications for licenses to operate public utilities.2
Sadly, Sweet's situation is typical of a type of licensing restric-
tion called the "certificate of necessity" or "certificate of need"
("CON") requirement. Unlike traditional occupational licenses,
* Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. J.D. 2002, Chapman
University School of Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College. Mr. Sandefur is an
adjunct fellow at the Cato Institute and the author of The Right to Earn a Living:
Economic Freedom and the Law (2010). He represented Adam Sweet in Sweet v.
Kroger, No. 08-671 (D. Or. 2008).
1. OR. Rx. STAT. § 825.110(1) (2009).
2. Oregon Public Utility Commission Order No. 92-1513 (Oct. 30, 1992)
(on file with author).
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CON laws are not meant to protect consumers or the general
public by requiring practitioners of a trade to demonstrate
expertise or education.3 Instead, these laws exist to restrict com-
petition and to boost the prices that established companies can
charge. This cartel system prevails in most states and in a variety
of industries, from moving companies to taxicabs,' hospitals,'
and car lots.'
CON laws restrict economic opportunity for entrepreneurs
and raise costs for products and services that consumers need,
simply to protect existing businesses against legitimate economic
competition. They have accordingly been subject to powerful
economic critiques.' In particular, although originally devised to
regulate markets that were considered public utilities or natural
monopolies, CON laws quickly spread to encompass industries
where healthy competition was the norm, leading to perverse
economic consequences.' In this Article, however, I want to
3. Regular occupational licensing laws, of course, are routinely exploited
by established industries to restrict competition and raise their own prices. See
generally MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? (2006); S. DAVID YOUNG, THE Runi OF EXPERTS:
OCCUPATIONAL. LICENSING IN AMERICA (1987); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1976); Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers As
Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 Mo. L. REV. 299, 314 (2004).
4. See Steven M. Simpson, judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests,
6 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 193-97 (2003).
5. See Roy CORDATO,JOHN LOCKE FOUND., CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED LAWS: IT'S
TIME FOR REPEAL. (2005), available at http://www.johnlocke.org/research/
show/policy%20reports/62.
6. See, e.g., TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT To EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC
FREEDOM AND THE LAw 170-74 (2010).
7. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 187, 222-40
(1982); Paul H. Gardner,Jr., Entry and Rate Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers
in Missouri: A Strategy for Reform, 47 Mo. L. REV. 693 (1982); Nicole Stelle Gar-
nett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 173 (2001); William K.Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 Cot.um. L. REv.
426 (1979).
8. Some excellent works on CON laws in other industries come to similar
conclusions to those I address here. In particular, studies of CON requirements
for hospitals have shown that they are "ineffective at controlling costs and
enhancing access" because they "allow incumbent firms to maintain higher
prices and higher costs." John E. Schneider & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, The Role of
Markets and Competition in Health Care Reform Initiatives to Improve Efficiency and
Enhance Access to Care, 37 CumB. L. REV. 479, 501-02 (2007). See, e.g., CORDATO,
supra note 5; Patrick John McGinley, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering
Certificate of Need Laws in a "Managed Competition" System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
141, 167 (1995); Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility
Planning: The Economic Theory and Political Realities of Certificates of Need, 4 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 261 (2001).
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address a broader question: in addition to their economic havoc,
I want to discuss the deleterious effects that CON restrictions
have on citizenship values and social philosophy. I will address
the moving industry in particular-a trade that differs from some
of the other industries subjected to CON restrictions, because it
has none of the features often taken as indicative of natural
monopolies: it has relatively low start-up costs (a truck; insur-
ance), low overhead, and it offers entry-level opportunities to
unskilled laborers. But a similar critique could apply to any of
the other industries subject to CON requirements. Whatever
their justification when applied to alleged monopoly markets or
public utilities, the use of CON laws in these competitive, entry-
level industries imposes major social and moral costs-infringing
the individual liberty of, and denying economic opportunity to,
precisely those people who most need meaningful constitutional
protection. Thus after a brief summary of the history of CON
regulations in Part I, I explain in Part II why they violate critical
social values of equality, publicness, and individual liberty. In
Part III, I contend that CON restrictions are unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment because they serve well-con-
nected private interests and are thus "naked preferences"' that
violate the due process and equal protection clauses.10
I. THE HISTORY OF CERTIFICATES OF NECESSITY
A. Occupational Licensing
Occupational licensing traces its roots back to the Medieval
guild system," but modern licensing came into its own in the
immediate aftermath of the Civil War" as reformers sought to
protect consumers from incompetent or fraudulent practitioners
or merchants. Yet these laws were also a handy means of restrict-
ing competition and favoring politically influential, established
businesses. Then, as now, the demand for regulations restricting
entry into trades often came from the practitioners of that trade,
who claimed, with varying degrees of plausibility, that such laws
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUm. L.
Rte:v. 1689, 1689 (1984).
10. I do not discuss here the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which I
would also argue prohibits the use of CON requirements. See generally Timothy
Sandefur, Pivileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & L-
ERTY 115 (2009). I also do not address the question of whether CON restric-
tions violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v.
Washington State Dep't of Health, 654 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2011).
11. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 9.
12. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERIcAN LAw 340 (3d ed.
2005).
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would protect the public health, safety, and welfare, but who just
as often hoped to use the law to monopolize markets and protect
their own private interests.. 3
Because licensing operates as a barrier to entry, it enables
existing tradesmen to raise their prices above market rates, and
reduces the pressure that existing firms feel to innovate or
improve service.' 4 Yet this system also provides insiders with cer-
tain non-economic advantages. For example, throughout the
nineteenth century, debates over licensing included a racial com-
ponent; they would use white laborers to prevent competition
from immigrants or minorities. In the South, blacks were often
barred from legal trades," and in California, licensing was often
advocated as a means of preventing the Chinese from entering
trades where they might compete against white labor.'
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to address the constitu-
tionality of occupational licensing restrictions was Dent v. West Vir-
ginia," which involved the licensing of medical doctors.
Interestingly, Dent was written by Justice Stephen J. Field, whose
reputation for advocating free markets and private property
rights is well deserved. Field was extraordinarily sensitive to
protecting the right to engage in a trade-a right, he observed,
that was protected by common law courts since at least the seven-
teenth century.' 9 In such cases as Cummings v. Missouri,o
Butcher's Union v. Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughtering
Corp.,2 1 and his famous dissents in The Slaughter-House Cases" and
Munn v. Illinois,23 Justice Field relied on the long history of com-
13. Id. at 340-56. Among the finest critics of the modern insensitivity to
the importance of economic liberty is MichaelJ. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the
Lochner Court, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 405 (1996) (providing an exceptionally
keen overview of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding protectionist
economic regulations).
14. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 49-57.
15. See generally David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of
the Use of Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEwo L.
REV. 89 (1994).
16. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases,
41 Wm. & MARY L. Riv. 211 (1999); Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in
the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's Rationality Review Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 457, 468-72 (2004).
17. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
18. See generally PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM
THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE (1997).
19. See SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 17-37.
20. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
21. 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
22. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
23. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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mon law protections for the right to enter and pursue a lawful
trade, arguing that the United States Constitution incorporated
and protected this right. This freedom to earn a living as one
chose was "the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United
States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avo-
cations are open without other restrictions than such as are
imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and condi-
tion."" While the government could, of course, "prescribe such
regulations . . . as will promote the public health, secure the
good order and advance the general prosperity of society," those
regulations must ensure that "the pursuit or calling [is] free to
be followed by every citizen who is within the conditions desig-
nated."" This right was "the fundamental idea upon which our
institutions rest."" The Constitution thus ensured that any per-
son could enter a trade free of "disparaging and partial enact-
ments""-that is, free of unreasonable government interference
and favoritism.
Thus it might initially come as a surprise that Field upheld
the constitutionality of occupational licensing in Dent. Yet in
Field's eyes, licensing the learned professions was a legitimate
use of the state's police power so long as it was done to protect
the general public from untrained or dangerous practitioners.
Because an incompetent doctor might kill or injure a patient in a
way that could not be fully compensated after the fact, the state
could legitimately try to prevent injuries by requiring practition-
ers to obtain the necessary training before entering the trade."
Nevertheless, Field was sensitive to the dangers of licensing.
Restricting entry into professions would only be legitimate so
long as the restrictions bore a genuine relationship to the prac-
tice of the trade in question. If, on the other hand, the state
abused its authority to create a cartel immune from fair competi-
tion, such laws would "operate to deprive one of his right to pur-
sue a lawful vocation"" and violate the Constitution. Thus
licensing laws could pass muster only if the licensing criteria were
24. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110 (Field, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 109-10.
28. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) ("The power of the
State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe
all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure them against
the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and
fraud.").
29. Id.
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"appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by rea-
sonable study or application."so
B. The Origins of Certificates of Necessity
Within a few years of the Dent decision, cities and states
began implementing CON requirements. The first CON law, as
William K Jones explains, was adopted in 1892 in New York to
regulate railroads."' CON requirements, indeed, were designed
to apply not to just any trade, but specifically to public utilities,
and in the years that followed, Massachusetts and other states
adopted such laws not only for railroads, but for gas, electric, and
telephone companies.3 2
Advocates of CON laws put forward a number of different
rationales for implementing so-called "regulated monopolies."
Probably the most plausible argument was that such laws would
encourage private investment in public utilities that would other-
wise be deterred by the heavy restrictions and regulations that
handicapped public common carriers in competition with less-
regulated private firms.33 By giving them a monopolistic advan-
tage, CON requirements would compensate investors for such
costly regulatory burdens as the rules that required railroads to
submit to rate regulation or to serve unprofitable or out-of-the-
way routes. Such restrictions made it more expensive for rail-
roads to operate-creating an incentive whereby competing
roads might engage in "cream-skimming": that is, serving only
more profitable users. The risk of more efficient competition
might deter private financiers from investing in a public railroad.
As the New York Board of Railroad Commissioners explained in
1884:
When the State has undertaken the control of railroads by
the creation of supervisory boards, and has determined to
exact the highest standard of service at reasonable rates of
freight and fare, it would certainly seem as if a correspond-
ing obligation rested upon it to protect existing railroads
from useless and disastrous competition by unnecessary
new ones.34
30. Id.
31. Jones, supra note 7, at 439.
32. Id. at 447, 450, 454.
33. See William B. Tye, The Economics of Public Convenience and Necessity for
Regulated Utilities, 60 TRANSP. Pinc. J. 143, 143 (1993).
34. Jones, supra note 7, at 438 (quoting 2 N.Y. BD. OF R.R. CoMm'Rs ANN.
REP. vii, xxix-xxx (1885)).
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CON restrictions were thus seen essentially as subsidies for
investment.
On the other hand, "cream-skimming" is just a self-serving
dysphemism for "economic efficiency."3 ' The alleged negative
effects of "cream-skimming" are imposed, not by competition,
but by the regulation itself, and generally ought to make the reg-
ulator reconsider the fairness or efficiency of the regulatory bur-
den rather than adding handicaps to more efficient competitors.
For "cream-skimming" to occur in the first place means that
some users of the service are being overcharged, and there is
nothing unfair in providing these users with a lower cost service
tailored to their needs."6 Forcing a business to serve out-of-the-
way customers violates the rights of business owners, increases
their cost of doing business, deters more productive investments,
imposes a drag on innovation and improvements in customer
service, and transfers wealth from customers in more convenient
locations to customers in less convenient locations. Price dis-
crimination, or other means by which providers can choose more
profitable markets, will decrease costs, improve service, create
incentives for customers to locate in more convenient loca-
tions-all while still allowing those in less convenient locations to
obtain services from other providers 37-and, by lowering costs
and improving efficiency, will even benefit out of the way
customers.
Of course, the entire system of economic dynamism consists
of "cream-skimming" of a sort: that is, a process of creative
destruction3 1 in which new innovations in technology or business
models attracts customers away from former methods of doing
business, even though this detracts from the profits of incumbent
35. See 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 221-23 (1971)
(explaining the economic efficiency of "cream-skimming"); Herbert
Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust
Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 761 n.240 (1985) ("Often what is characterized as
'cream skimming' by an incumbent monopolist is really a sign that, because of
technological change, the market is becoming competitive."); Peter Smith, Sub-
scribing to Monopoly: The Telecom Monopolist's Lexicon-Revisited, Pun. Po'Y FOR
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Sept. 1995, available at www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/
Document.2361.pdf.
36. On the contrary, it is unjust to coerce businesses to provide unprofita-
ble services or customers to subsidize less-profitable users. See also Dan W.
Brock & Allen Buchanan, Ethical Issues in For-Profit Health Care, in FOR-PROFIT
ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 224 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986).
37. THOMAS SOWEL., KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 189 (1980); Melvin D.
Barger, Free Market Mail is on the Horizon, 37 FREEMAN 286, 287-88 (1987).
38. SeeJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81
(1942) (popularizing the term "creative destruction").
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firms." The most famous articulation of this principle came in
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,40 in which the Court refused
to interpret the corporate charter of an existing toll bridge as a
monopoly prohibiting competition from another bridge: "Let it
once be understood that such charters carry with them these
implied [monopolies] . . . and you will soon find the old turnpike
corporations awakening from their sleep, and calling upon this
Court to put down . . . rail roads and canals."" If existing busi-
nesses could prevent newcomers from entering the market
because competition would threaten the viability of their invest-
ments, progress would come to a standstill, and the operators of
established industries would enjoy privileges denied to other citi-
zens who were supposed to enjoy equal rights before the law.
We shall be thrown back to the improvements of the last
century, and obliged to stand still, until the claims of the
old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied; and they shall
consent to permit these states to avail themselves of the
lights of modern science, and to partake of the benefit of
those improvements which are now adding to the wealth
and prosperity, and the convenience and comfort, of every
other part of the civilized world.
Thus, although the economic justifications of CON require-
ments in the realm of public utilities were dubious-resting on
questionable economic assumptions that, taken to their logical
extremes, would stifle innovation and prevent economic growth,
and on vague notions of fairness that favored established busi-
nesses against more cost-effective alternatives-they were at least
intended to address economic problems arising in monopolistic
industries or among public utilities. The next step in the saga
was the perverse application of such laws to normal, competitive
industries.
39. Proponents of the "cream-skimming" theory do not deny this, but
define "cream-skimming" as providing services at lower prices by "evading regu-
latory price or service requirements," KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAw: Eco-
NoMIc THEORY AND COMMON LAw EVOLUTION 227 n.79 (2003), which is to say,
that the industry in question fails to provide the inefficient services that the
proponent herself believes ought to be provided. This is just another of the
many ways in which people define "market failure" as the market failing to do
what they want it to do. See generally BRIAN P. SIMPSON, MARKETs DON'T FAIL!
(2005).
40. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
41. Id. at 552-53.
42. Id. at 553.
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C. Spread to Non-Public Utilities
The advent of the automobile bolstered advocates of CON
laws in some ways. Jitney-cabs, for example, provided a new
means of transportation that did not require heavy start-up costs,
and they were much better suited to engage in "cream-skim-
ming"-that is, they were able to efficiently get passengers to
their destinations without stopping unnecessarily at fixed points
on the way, as street cars or buses were required to.4 3 Streetcar
and bus companies naturally saw new competition as unfair, and
sought, successfully in many instances, to use CON restrictions to
block cab services from starting up." In 1913, for example, New
York enacted the first CON requirement for automobile buses,
out of what the state's Public Service Commission called "a sense
of fairness to the private interests already engaged in these fields
of work."" The Commission claimed it was not trying to prevent
innovation and free enterprise, but its "sense of fairness" led it to
do just that. In 1915, the commission refused to allow a jitney
company to compete against a streetcar line, even while admit-
ting that the streetcars were providing poor service. "Competing
companies, operating in a single field," it declared, "were never
likely to achieve such secure financial standing as to enable
them, collectively, to give as good service as a single well-regu-
lated monopoly."4 6
Yet the automobile also radically altered markets and lifes-
tyles, and whatever sense previous regulatory arrangements had
made, the new technology rendered them obsolete in many ways.
This is perhaps most obvious in the market for household goods
movers. An automobile-based moving company may compete
with a railroad freight hauler in some ways, but their competition
simply is not analogous to the competition between, say, taxicabs
and city buses. Railroads and household goods movers do not
typically serve the same customer base: automobile movers pro-
vide door-to-door services to individuals or specific firms; they
are not as well-equipped to carry extremely heavy or bulky freight
as are railroads, and they do not serve a regular route between
fixed points. These two industries are better seen as roviding
different, if overlapping, services, than as direct rivals mean-
ing that the alleged risk of "cream skimming" is minimal.
43. Jones, supra note 7, at 485.
44. Garnett, supra note 7, at 199-203.
45. Jones, supra note 7, at 486 (quoting 1916A Pub. U. Rep. 33, 41 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2d Dist. 1915)).
46. Id. at 487 (quoting 1916A Pub. U. Rep. at 44).
47. See Gardner, supra note 7, at 700-01 (explaining how automobile-
based movers differ from railroad freight haulers).
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It is simply not reasonable to define the moving industry as
either a public utility or a natural monopoly.48 Movers do not
have a solid network structure or distribution system or regular
routes; they do not have massive sunk costs, since a moving com-
pany can be started with a truck and an employee or two; they
are not government-owned, and are certainly not a traditional
government function." There are no inherent features of the
business that make a single firm more efficient than multiple
firms, or that limit competition so as to allow a single firm to
extract monopoly profits.5 o
Yet states, and later the federal government, applied CON
requirements to automobile-based moving companies, appar-
ently without giving much thought to whether the economic
arguments advanced in favor of CON laws for public utilities
actually applied with equal force to an industry that is really a
textbook case of a competitive market.5 1
Some advocates of CON requirements for automobile indus-
tries did recognize that cabs and moving companies were not
public utilities or monopolies, but they advanced instead a differ-
ent and flimsier justification: the idea of "excessive" or "destruc-
tive" competition. Under this theory, competition leads to a race
to the bottom, in which service diminishes, prices fall, and ulti-
mately businesses are driven out of the market altogether, leav-
ing customers with no service. In a 1918 New York case, for
48. See BREYER, supra note 7, at 236.
49. See Rick Geddes, Public Utilities, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND Eco-
NOMics: THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 1162-1205 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (describing characteristics of public utilities). One
reason that railroads were defined as public utilities early in American history is
that roads in general were a traditional government function, and a railroad
was therefore seen as exercising a delegated sovereign authority to construct
roads. See Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 651, 654-60 (2005).
50. See Gardner, supra note 7, at 705 ("the cost conditions of natural
monopoly are absent in an unregulated motor carrier environment."). Cf
Peter Z. Grossman, Is Anything Naturally a Monopoly?, in 7 THE ECONOMIcS OF
LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 11, 12 (Peter Z. Grossman &
Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003) (listing characteristics typically taken as defining a
natural monopoly); Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in 2 HAND-
BOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1229, 1248 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007) (same).
51. See Gardner, supra note 7, at 706-07 ("The absence of structural char-
acteristics attributable to natural monopoly obliterates this argument for direct
economic regulation of motor carriers. The classical free market model is
much more descriptive of the competitive tendencies of an unregulated motor
carrier industry.").
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example, the Public Service Commission explained that the rea-
son that CON laws were used to prevent competition
is that the business being divided between two carriers will
be profitable to neither, and that in the long run the
equipment of both will wear out in unprofitable service
and neither will be able to continue. The result would be
that the public would not be able to get any permanent
service whatever.5 2
Such a statement demonstrates profound economic igno-
rance. In a competitive market, a firm's investment in mainte-
nance will be driven down, but only to an efficient level; once
service suffers, consumers will shift their custom to a competing
firm that provides better service. Likewise, prices will fall, but
only to a level at which a firm can continue to pay its bills. The
supply and demand curves will not collapse to zero unless con-
sumers abandon the firm altogether-which they will only do if
the service is so bad that consumers are better off without it. 5 3
There is nothing wrong with this; as then-Professor Stephen
Breyer wrote, "competition drives firms out of business because
the survivors can do the same job better, more efficiently, or with
fewer employees."5 4
It is perverse to describe a process whereby consumers and
producers non-coercively choose to allocate resources in a pro-
ductive, mutually satisfactory way as "destructive." Conversely, it
is absurd to describe a legal regime that erects cartels of politi-
cally preferred firms against fair economic competition as "pro-
gressive." 5 Nevertheless, this is just what happened in the first
three decades of the twentieth century, when the notion of
52. Jones, supra note 7, at 488 (quoting Flori Buschini, 7 N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 2d Dist. 299, 301 (1918)).
53. See 2 MURRAv N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TRUATISE
ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 600-04 (1962).
54. BREYER, sup-a note 7, at 30. The same reasoning, incidentally, reveals
the logical fallacy inherent in the notion of "predatory pricing." As Breyer
noted, "predatory pricing" schemes only work if the so-called predator can bar
re-entry into the market. See id. at 32. The Supreme Court endorsed this idea
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993),
when it held that a plaintiff can only state a cause of action for predatory pric-
ing if she can demonstrate that the alleged "predator" was likely to recuperate
the costs incurred by the temporary cost-cutting. Unfortunately, many states
refuse to apply this rule, leading to anti-competitive public policy that simply
prohibits low prices. See, e.g., Bay Guardian Co. v. New Times Media, LLC, 114
Cal. Rptr. 3d 392 (Ct. App. 2010).
55. See generally GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 172-81
(1963).
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"excessive competition" was quite popular." The result was a
regulatory regime, with effects lasting to this day, in which entry
into fully competitive markets is restricted by government agen-
cies that act solely as protectors of established cartels that exploit
government for their private interests.
II. CITIZENSHIP VALUES AND CON BARRIERS
As should be obvious, entry-restricting CON laws raise prices
by increasing the cost for potential competitors to enter the mar-
ket and generate dynamic competition. They reduce the incen-
tives for improving service, lowering prices, or diversifying. They
also inefficiently" drive investment into unproductive activity; on
the incumbent side, the rents available through such restrictions
encourage existing firms to over-invest in policing rivals and tat-
tling on unlicensed movers." As Breyer observed, "classical price
and entry regulation is particularly unsuited to a competitively
structured industry .... [W] hen it is applied to such an industry,
there are likely to be certain predictable effects: higher than
competitive prices, a stable industry structure, uneconomic pric-
ing rules, and inefficiency.""
But worse than the increase in prices for consumers is the
effect that barriers to entry have on newcomers. CON restric-
tions bar entrepreneurs and new workers from laboring produc-
tively and exercising their liberty to provide for themselves and
their families.o Aside from the economic consequences-
destroying potential productivity before it is born-these restric-
56. Probably the leading judicial advocate of the idea was Justice Louis
Brandeis. See generally ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN
STATE 81-89 (1933); MICHAEL J. PHIIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND
RiArrY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890s TO THE 1930s, at 101-05
(2001).
57. I expressed some discomfort with the "inefficiency" in Timothy
Sandefur, Does the State Create the Market-And Should It Pursue Efficiency?, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. Pot'v 779 (2010). My critique there was that the apparent
moral neutrality embedded in most uses of the term "efficient" is illusory and
misleading. My critique of the ineffiency of rent-seeking, as will be clear below,
is therefore not based on abstract inefficiency, but on the idea that it is coercive
and objectively wrong as a normative matter.
58. SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON-
SENT 111 (1962) ("[B]argaining opportunities afforded in the political process
cause the individual to invest more resources in decision-making, and, in this
way, cause the attainment of 'solution' to be much more costly.") (emphasis
omitted); Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 16 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
59. BREYER, supra note 7, at 238.
60. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Jennifer L. Fearing, Occupational Licens-
ing and the Transition from Welfare to Work, 19 J. LABOR RE.s. 277 (1998).
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tions impose terrible social costs in terms of public philosophy.
Legal protections for cartels sap industriousness, twist the pro-
ductive, independent spirit of creativity and hard work into polit-
ical manipulativeness and an us-versus-them mentality, quickly
magnetize around racial or class poles, and send the message
that social mobility is an illusion. They breed resentment and
deny opportunity to those who need it most.'
Among the social values central to a free society are the prin-
ciples of equality, publicness, and individual liberty, which pro-
vide the bare minimum for any polity that aspires to legitimacy
and freedom. The people must enjoy at least relatively equal
treatment before the law; the ruling authorities must govern in
the public interest rather than in the private interest; and the
laws must guarantee a sphere of freedom or individual autonomy
in which each person can direct the course of his or her own life.
To the degree that a society fails to abide by these principles, it is
neither free nor lawful. CON restrictions that bar entry into the
market in order to protect the interests of established firms vio-
late all three of these principles.
A. Equality, Publicness, and Individual Liberty
Equality is the starting point of American political philoso-
phy." The proposition that "all men are created equal" is not a
mere rhetorical device-it is essential to the classical liberal polit-
ical theory that motivated the founders of the American republic.
It is because no human beings are marked out as inherently qual-
ified to rule the lives of others and dictate their choices, that
each person is free to run his or her own life, while respecting
that same right in others. As Algernon Sidney observed, in words
later paraphrased by Thomas Jefferson,
[L]iberty being only an exemption from the dominion of
another, the question ought not to be, how a nation can
come to be free, but how a man comes to have a dominion
over it; for till the right of dominion be proved and justi-
fied, liberty subsists as arising from the nature and being of
a man . . . . Man therefore must be naturally free, unless
he be created by another power than we have yet heard of
.... God only who confers this right upon us, can deprive
us of it: and we can no way understand that he does so,
61. See also Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get There From Here?: How the Law
Still Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2004); Robert L. Woodson, Race
and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAND. L. Rrv. 1017, 1041-43 (1989).
62. See generally HARRY V. JAFFA, How To THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 13-48 (1978).
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unless he had so declared by express revelation, or had set
some distinguishing marks of dominion and subjection
upon men; and as an ingenious person not long since said,
caused some to be born with crowns upon their heads, and
all others with saddles upon their backs.6 3
As this passage makes clear, the concept of equality is deeply
connected to the idea of natural liberty, or what has lately been
called the "presumption of liberty."6 4 The proposition all people
are equally born free is not a subjective preference or an arbi-
trary postulate; rather, it is an inherent principle of logic: we pre-
sume that individuals are free to act unless good reason is given
why they should not be." And each person equally enjoys this
presumption of liberty; there is no prima facie reason why one
should rule over another. People equally have this liberty
because each individual is presumptively responsible to choose
his or her own actions, and to enjoy the rewards, and suffer the
consequences. Nobody can alienate his or her responsibility-
no person can truly lay the blame for a voluntary act on
another-and therefore each person must enjoy the freedom to
make choices of acting or not acting. Equality and individual lib-
erty are thus deeply connected." And if people are presump-
tively free, then the onus of proof falls on the party who asserts a
claim to rule over them, which means that people have the right
to government by consent. The legitimacy of political rule is
therefore not natural, but conventional-the product of agree-
ment, even if only tacit. Yet the legitimacy of such an agreement
depends on deeper principles which agreement cannot exceed;
people cannot legitimately agree to commit an injustice against a
third party, because that would contradict the more fundamental
principle of the third party's equal rights.6 7
63. ALGERNON StoNiy, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 510-11
(Thomas G. West ed., Liberty Classics 1990) (1698); cf Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Roger Weightman (June 24, 1826), in THOMASJEFFERSON: WRITINGS
1517 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) ("The general spread of the light of sci-
ence has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of
mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few
booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.").
64. See RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRE-
summTiON OF LIBERTY 244-45 (2004).
65. See ANTHONY DE JASAY, JUSTICE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS 150 (2002).
66. See also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 504 (J.P.
Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., HarperCollins 1969) (1835) ("[Mlen can-
not be absolutely equal without being entirely free . . . .").
67. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-94 (Peter Las-
lett ed, Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 1963) (1690).
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Equality is not only deeply related to liberty, but also to what
I have called the publicness of the government's acts. Because
political society is an association of basically equal, autonomous
individuals who have the power of choice, a legitimate state can-
not be oriented around exploiting the people for the ruler's pri-
vate purposes, but must instead be organized around addressing
the interests of all. Aristotle famously used this criterion to dis-
tinguish between corrupt and legitimate regimes:" societies
organized to serve the ruler's own interests he analogized to the
rule of the master over the slave-these included the corrupt
regimes of despotism, oligarchy, and democracy (using the word
in its classical sense as meaning standardless mob-rule)-while
legitimate regimes were, by contrast, communities of free people,
in which legislation was directed toward accomplishing public
goods. Into this category he put monarchy, aristocracy, and pol-
ity. Building on this framework, Roman political philosophers
would use the word "res publica" to describe a healthy political
society-a society that concerned itself with the "public things,"
rather than the private interest of the powers that be.
Different types of political regime can be ascribed different
fundamental values," but in the liberal political order estab-
lished by the American Constitution, laws are organized around
guaranteeing individual liberty. As Locke explained, this does
not mean anarchy or chaos, but a society which protects individu-
als from the harms of others and also from the harms of the
government
where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. For Liberty is to be
free from restraint and violence from others which cannot
be, where there is no Law: But Freedom is not, as we are
told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he lists: (For who
could be free, when every other Man's Humour might
domineer over him?) But a Liberty to dispose, and order, as
he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole
Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under which
he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of
another, but freely follow his own.7 0
Thus the polity is designed to maximize the individual's abil-
ity to pursue happiness by ensuring that citizens are protected
68. ARiSTOTLE, PoLITIcs bk. III, 1279a-b, at 76-78 (C.D.C. Reeve trans.,
Hackett Publishing 1998) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
69. See, e.g., I BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWs bk. III
(Timothy Dwight et al. eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Colonial Press, 1899)
(1784); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 467 (Har-
vest/HBJ 1973) (1966).
70. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 324.
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from force or fraud committed by others and also from force or
fraud committed by the government itself." Law exists to pro-
tect individual freedom, to ensure that each person is best able to
apply his or her skills and knowledge to the problems and the
joys of living." While law can also accomplish other public pur-
poses and provide other public goods, such actions are legitimate
only if they are consistent with the deeper purposes and princi-
ples established by the rule of individual rights and equality.
This is why, for example, the government may take private prop-
erty to devote to public uses but must provide just compensation
to the owner. This rule (when it operates properly) reconciles
the government's provision of public goods with the rights of the
71. See, e.g., THE FEDERAiST No. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) ("the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquir-
ing property" is "the first object of government."); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to controul itself."). It is sometimes said that modern political
philosophy, and particularly the classical liberalism of Locke, "lowered the stan-
dard of virtue to make it attainable." See, e.g., LEO STRAUSs, What Is Political
Philosophy? (1959), reprinted in AN INTROi)UCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 3,
50-51 (Hilail Gilden ed., 1989).
Machiavelli's discovery or invention of the need for an immoral or
amoral substitute for morality became victorious through Locke's dis-
covery or invention that that substitute is acquisitiveness. Here we
have an utterly selfish passion whose satisfaction does not require the
spilling of any blood and whose effect is the improvement of the lot of
all. In other words, the solution of the political problem by economic
means is the most elegant solution ....
Id. This seems simply a way of denigrating a great philosophical achievement:
the articulation and constitutionalization of the bourgeois values-values of
peace, productivity, and independence-that I discuss in more detail below.
72. This is what the Court was referring to when it declared that the lib-
erty protected by the Constitution is essentially about "the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Justice Scalia, among others, has ridiculed this statement,
see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), but lib-
erty is not susceptible of any more precise definition. The word describes an
unbounded field of operations in which an individual may inquire into herself
and into nature, and seek those goals that she determines to be the most com-
pelling, in general and in particular-whether that be a career, study, hobby,
family, religion, social work, etc. In Jefferson's words, "rightful liberty is unob-
structed action according to our will, within the limits drawn around us by the
equal rights of others. I do not add 'within the limits of the law,' because law is
often but the tyrant's will and always so when it violates the right of an individ-
ual." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany (Apr. 4, 1819), inJEFFER-
SON: POLITICAL WRITINGs 224 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
INSIDERS, OU737DES, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
individuals who make up the society.7 ' As James Madison
explained, the American regime reversed the order under which
European despotisms had languished, in which individual rights
were seen as privileges given to the people by the ruler; instead,
the American system recognizes a more basic principle of indi-
vidual rights by comparison to which government action is to be
judged.7 4
If equality, publicness, and individual liberty are social val-
ues, they are echoed in the private values of responsible citizen-
ship: mutual respect, civic involvement, and personal industry.
These "bourgeois virtues"75 received their most eloquent early
expression in The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, the classic
which became America's favorite work of business advice in its
first century.7 ' The image of young Franklin, arriving penniless
in Philadelphia with a loaf of bread under each arm, looking for
ajob7 7 -or pushing his wheelbarrow full of paper down the main
street to build his reputation as an industrious printer, 7  and
devoting himself to good civic works and clever new ideas-like
street-sweeping and lending libraries-was, and ought to remain,
the image of the prototypical American citizen, devoting his hon-
est industry to providing for himself and his family, thereby con-
tributing to a healthy society and preparing the way for the next
generation's progress. Only a few decades after Franklin's death,
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that in America, all honest trades
were considered dignified:
73. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 42 (1985) ("If the state obtains its authority only from the
rights of those whom it represents, it can never claim exemption from the duty
to compensate on the ground that it is the source of all rights. The natural
rights theory behind the Constitution precludes that result.").
74. SeeJames Madison, Charters, NAT'L GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 1792, reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 502 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) ("In Europe, charters
of liberty have been granted by power. America has set the example . . . of
charters of power granted by liberty.").
75. I borrow this term from DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS VIR-
TUES: ETHICS FOR AN AGE OF COMMERCE (2006). McCloskey identifies the bour-
geois virtues as courage, justice, temperance, prudence, faith, hope, and love,
but I believe that this list subsumes the virtues I list here, and any differences
between our lists are not relevant to the argument I am making.
76. See generally WALTER ISAAGSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERicAN LIFE
471-75 (2003); Harvey C. Mansfield, Liberty and Virtue in the American Founding,
in NEVER A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE: SUSTAINING VIRTUE IN A FREE REPUBLIC 3,
9-15 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2003).
77. Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography, reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN:
WRITINGS 1305, 1329 U.A. Leo Lemay ed., 1987).
78. Id. at 1369.
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Among democratic peoples where there is no heredi-
tary wealth, every man works for his living, or has worked,
or comes from parents who have worked. Everything
therefore prompts the assumption that to work is the nec-
essary, natural, and honest condition of all men.
Not only is no dishonor associated with work, but
among such peoples it is regarded as positively honorable;
the prejudice is for, not against it.
Equality makes not only work itself, but work specifi-
cally to gain money, honorable.7 9
In contrast with aristocracies, where the principle of honor
forces people to disguise the profitability of their labors, citizens
in a democracy see work and profit as ennobling. "As the desire
for prosperity is universal, fortunes are middling and ephemeral,
and everyone needs to increase his resources or create fresh ones
for his children, all see quite clearly that it is profit which, if not
wholly then at least partially, prompts them to work."" It is,
indeed, the "habits born of equality" that "naturally lead men in
the direction of trade and industry.""
These industrial, bourgeois virtues are inherently demo-
cratic; they are the driving force behind a community of produc-
tivity, respect, and mutual encouragement, and they demand
much of people. But the framework in which they operate is
constructed of the political mores, and when those mores are
twisted to different purposes, the private virtues suffer; they
become counter-productive and wither into resentment, distrust,
bitterness, and fear. In a political society where mutual respect,
industry, and responsible citizenship are not rewarded, or even
punished, people will come to follow the incentives around
them, and transform themselves into anti-social, grasping crea-
tures, seeking advantage at the expense of others, indifferent to
social costs." When institutions deny people economic opportu-
nity to benefit political insiders, those people will be less likely to
79. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 550.
80. Id. at 550-51.
81. Id. at 551.
82. There is no better literary depiction of this phenomenon than the
famous "bum's speech" in AvN RAND, ATiAs SHRUGGED 661-72 (1957). A more
recent dramatic depiction of the same phenomenon appears in the HBO series,
The Wire, particularly the first season, in which the conscientious detective
Jimmy McNulty is repeatedly sabotaged and treated with resentment by his fel-
low police officers because he makes their lives difficult. See, e.g., Susan A.
Bandes, And All the Pieces Matter: Thoughts on The Wire and the CriminaIljustice
System, 8 OHIo ST.J. CRIM. L. 435, 438 (2011).
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take entrepreneurial risks with new ideas, but will seek instead to
protect their own "turf."
In the American regime, equality, publicness, and individual
liberty are not "vague ethico-political First Principles";" they are
the basic boundaries of what qualifies as a legitimate exercise of
government power under a social compact that aims at specified
goals. These principles set the criteria for distinguishing genu-
ine law from arbitrary exertions of power." In a despotism,
where "law" is synonymous with "the will of the ruler," there is no
basis from which to condemn the ruler's actions as "unlawful,"
since doing so would beg the question. But in the liberal polity,
abstract principles establish the framework for legitimate govern-
ment actions, so these principles serve as standards by which to
determine whether a government action qualifies as legitimate-
i.e., lawful-or whether they are arbitrary, unauthorized govern-
ment acts; acts of mere force or fraud. Just as an agent has no
authority to act contrary to the scope of the principal's grant of
power, so a government act that violates the principles of equal-
ity, publicness, and individual liberty, is arbitrary, irrational, and
unlawful.
This is what Justice Chase meant in his famous opinion in
Calder v. Bull," where he wrote that "An ACT of the Legislature
(for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority."" An attempt by the government to exer-
cise power merely because it wished to do so, rather than by ref-
erence to the underlying values of the Constitution, would betray
the entire normative framework from which the legislature draws
its legitimacy-in just the same way that a bank robber, who
chooses to rob the bank where he works, is acting against the
principles underlying his authority and cannot therefore be said
to be acting within the scope of his employment. 7 Thus while
the government may "enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish" and
"command what is right and prohibit what is wrong," it may not
use power merely to impose burdens on unpopular groups,
obtain private benefits for rulers or cronies, or act arbitrarily just
83. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
84. See generally Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or
the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283 (2011).
85. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
86. Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.).
87. See Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs.
Corp., 496 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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because it feels like it." For legislation to be legitimate-to qual-
ify as genuine law-in the American constitutional order, it must
fall within the delegation of authority to the legislature, a delega-
tion that is conditioned on certain principles, including equality,
publicness, and individual liberty. In short, the American Consti-
tution erects a wall around political actors-that wall is the law,
and it protects individuals from the arbitrary violence of govern-
ment officials in the same way that it protects citizens from each
other.
These may seem like abstractions, but the reason that
"[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States which
does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one"" is that these
principles have real effect in the everyday workings of constitu-
tional democracy. As the Supreme Court explained in cases like
Loan Association v. Topeka,o Hurtado v. California,9 ' and Lawrence
v. Texas,92 the distinction between lawful government activity and
arbitrary, unjustified assertions of power, is not merely a formalis-
tic or ritualistic one; that distinction relies on the substantive val-
ues inherent in the constitutional order. Thus where a politically
influential group uses government power for its own self-interest,
in a way that burdens or dispossesses a politically disfavored
group, or simply as an act of will, that power is an arbitrary act,
and not genuine law: "Arbitrary power . . . is not law, whether
manifested as the decree of [a] personal monarch or of an
impersonal multitude." Thus "partial and arbitrary exertions of
power under the forms of legislation" are not genuinely lawful;
they "transcend[ ] the limits of lawful authority, even when act-
ing in the name and wielding the force of the government."93
B. CON Restrictions and the Values of American Society
How do these broad principles apply to something as mun-
dane as a certificate of necessity requirement? There is probably
nothing so easily identified with the American Dream as the free-
dom to try one's hand at a trade and earn a living for oneself.
Yet CON laws and licensing requirements frequently restrict the
economic opportunity of people who lack political influence,
doing violence to the American Dream and to the principles of
88. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.
89. DF TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 270.
90. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
91. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
92. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
93. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536.
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equality, publicness, and individual liberty that are central to our
society.
Consider, for example, the florist licensing law at issue in
Meadows v. Odom." That law, first enacted in 1939, required any
person wanting to practice the trade of floristry to first obtain a
government license; to get a license, an applicant was required to
pass a one-hour written examination and a four-hour practice
exam. There was a $150 examination fee, and the exam was
administered quarterly in Baton Rouge-meaning that appli-
cants from other cities would also have to pay travel and lodging
expenses. Worse, test takers were graded on such subjective fac-
tors as the "scale," "harmony," "accent," and "unity" of their floral
designs. 5
Sandy Meadows, a widow from Monroe, Louisiana, moved to
Baton Rouge in 2000, where she found ajob in the floral depart-
ment at an Albertson's supermarket." She was a high-school
dropout with no training or degree. Indeed, she had taken the
floral exam three times without success. But she had nine years
experience working with flowers, and her floral arrangements
were good enough that she was put in charge of the floral depart-
ment-that is, until the state Horticulture Commission discov-
ered she was arranging flowers without their permission. They
issued a $250 citation against her, and notified Albertson's that
she could work only as a "floral clerk"-meaning that the store
would also have to hire a full-time, licensed florist to "oversee"
her work. Employing two workers to run the floral department
was not economically feasible, and Meadows lost her job. She
filed a civil rights lawsuit, arguing that the licensing law unrea-
sonably deprived her of the right to earn a living at a lawful occu-
pation." In defense, the government did remarkably little to
conceal the protectionist nature of the law. Bob Odom, the
state's Commissioner of Agriculture and Chairman of the Louisi-
ana Horticulture Commission, testified that he had "committed
to the florists when [he] ran [for office] in 1980 that [he] would
support their desires of either having or get[ting] rid of the [flo-
94. Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as
moot, 198 Fed. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2006).
95. Let a Thousand Florists Bloom: Uprooting Outrageous Licensing Laws in
Louisiana, INST. FORJusT., http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=comcontent&
task=view&id=748&Itemid=165 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
96. The facts of this case are described in id. and in Clark Neily, Remarks
at the Cato Institute Book Forum: The Right to Earn A Living: How Government
Sty/les Initiative and Harms Economic Growth, CATO INST. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://
www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=7312.
97. See Meadows, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
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rist licensing] law""-that is, that he would retain the law not to
protect the public, but to advance the interests of established flo-
rists seeking to retain their cartel. Moreover, Louisiana was the
only state to require professional licensing of florists. A 1939
Michigan case did invalidate a Detroit licensing requirement for
selling flowers-a requirement the court found was "not [writ-
ten] to protect the citizens of Detroit in their public health,
safety, morals or general welfare, but . .. for the financial benefit
of a few" 9 -but it appears that no state had ever imposed such a
burdensome educational and testing requirement on the simple
trade of arranging flowers.
Nevertheless, the district court upheld the law, on the flimsi-
est of pretexts: florists often use wires and plastic sticks to hold
floral arrangements together, so the licensing restriction served
the public health and safety by ensuring that consumers would
not scratch their fingers on the wires. ' 0
The case was appealed, but in the meantime, Sandy Mead-
ows, who suffered severe health problems, was left unemployed
and unable to pay her utility bills. Her attorney, Clark Neily,
recalled:
The last time I saw Sandy, she was lying on a couch in
about 100 degree temperature in Baton Rouge, about 98
percent humidity, outside of her apartment in a common
area with no air conditioning. . . . She had just had gall
bladder surgery, so she was literally stapled with surgical
staples . . . lying on a couch in 100 degree weather, barely
able to breathe. I checked her into a Motel 6 so she could
have some air conditioning. I went to the Piggly Wiggly
grocery store and paid her utility bill so it could get turned
back on. I went and took care of my business with the
state, in the course of working on the case, and a few days
later Sandy died. And that's the last time I ever saw her.
Sandy died because the state of Louisiana [took away] her
economic liberty and put it in the hands of a bunch of spe-
cial interest[s]. The Louisiana state florist association's
straight-up cartel had gotten that law passed that said that a
woman like Sandy Meadows can't make a living doing the
98. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 29-30, Meadows v. Odom, No. 03-960 (M.D.
La. Dec. 28, 2004) (on file with author).
99. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 287 N.W. 427, 430 (Mich. 1939).
100. Meadows, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 823-24 (holding the law was "rationally
related to the state's desire that floral arrangements will be assembled properly
in a manner least likely to cause injury to a consumer and will be prepared in a
proper, cost efficient manner.").
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one thing she knows how to do . . .. And I hold them at
fault, in part, for her death.'o'
This is only one particularly dramatic example of the delete-
rious effects that barriers to economic liberty can have on some
of America's most vulnerable people: the uneducated poor, who
lack the wherewithal to obtain training and undergo the expen-
sive and time-consuming process of licensing. It is impossible to
assess the economic costs that these restrictions impose, since they
are what economists call "unseen": they take the form of the
countless businesses that nobody ever starts, the productivity that
is never begun, the wealth that is never created.' 02 But it is also
impossible to assess the terrible damage that such restrictions
inflict on a society that claims to be governed by principles of
equality, publicness, and individual liberty. It is difficult for
someone standing at the bottom of the economic ladder to
believe she can climb it-or that our nation's professed values of
opportunity and openness mean anything-when even such a
trade as floristry is governed by licensing restrictions that politi-
cally entrenched interests use to prevent fair competition.
The law challenged in Meadows was not a CON law, but if
anything, CON laws impose even more severe strains on these
values. While the florist licensing requirement at least purported
to protect the public, CON restrictions exist for the explicit pur-
pose of preventing competition and keeping the prices of
existing businesses high. Like occupational licensing, these laws
bar entrepreneurial opportunity, stifle the creativity and industry
of those who might otherwise be productive innovators in our
society, and lead to bitterness and resentment against the hypoc-
risy of a nation that claims to care about economic opportunity,
social mobility, and the "natural aristocracy" of "virtue and tal-
ents,""' and which rewards merit instead of political influence.
Consider the situation of Adam Sweet, the entry-level
laborer in Portland, Oregon, with little business experience, who
wanted to open a moving company. Under state law, he was first
required to obtain permission from ODOT."' After he filed his
101. Neily, supra note 96. Not long after Meadows' death, Hurricane
Katrina struck New Orleans, and the remaining plaintiffs in the case left Louisi-
ana. The case was therefore deemed moot on appeal and vacated. Meadows v.
Odom, 198 Fed. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2006).
102. See Frederic Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, reprinted in THE
LIBERTARIAN READER 265 (David Boaz ed., 1997); see also HENRY HAZLRTT, Eco-
NOMIeS IN ONE LESSON (1979).
103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2
THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LE-FfERS 387, 388 (Lester J. Cappon ed. 1959).
104. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 825.005(7) (a), 825.110 (2009).
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application, however, ODOT was required to notify existing mov-
ing companies and give them the opportunity to object.'o1 The
statute only allowed existing moving companies to object-not
members of the general public-and when an objection was
filed, ODOT would convene a hearing at which Sweet would
have to prove that a new moving company would serve the "pub-
lic convenience and necessity."'oe Because no law or regulation
defined these terms, ODOT relied instead on a 20-year-old order
from a different agency, the Public Utilities Commission, which
did not define these terms either, but which provided broad
descriptions of factors the Commission had considered in the
past. 1o7 It included such helpful phrasing as:
The three elements [for "address [ing] the issue of public
convenience and necessity"] include:
1. Whether the proposed service would be responsive to a
public need for transportation.
2. Whether the proposed service could better serve that
need than the service provided by existing carriers.
3. If there are affirmative findings on the first two factors,
whether a diversion of traffic from protesting carriers will
occur which impairs the transportation services provided
to the public. 08
What constituted "need" or "better serv[ice]" was unclear,
and what sort of "diversion of traffic" was unacceptable was left to
bureaucrats to determine. But the order did note that an appli-
cant might demonstrate a public need by providing "testimony of
shipper witnesses"-that is, of potential future customers-
"who, after making reasonable and good faith efforts to hire
motor carriers, have been unable to obtain consistent and ade-
quate transportation service."on In other words, an applicant
would have to enlist potential future customers-not actual cus-
tomers-to attend a meeting of a public commission, which
meets during the working day, and to testify that he or she had
tried to hire an existing moving company and was unable to
obtain consistent and adequate service-not just once, but
repeatedly, and after "good faith" efforts (whatever that might
mean). Just to clarify, the guidelines reiterated that even ifsuch a
person could be found willing to take time to testify on behalf of
105. OR. REV. STAT. § 825.110(1) (2009).
106. OR. REv. STAT. § 825.110(4)(c) (2009).
107. Oregon Public Utility Commission Order No. 92-1513 (Oct. 30,
1992) (on file with author).
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id.
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an applicant who is not even yet running a moving business, that
person's mere preference was not sufficient: "A shipper's prefer-
ence for the applicant over others who are available to provide
service does not establish public need . " o
Worse, these guidelines incorporated explicitly protectionist
elements. Aside from the rule against "diversion of traffic" from
existing firms, the order observed that "the Commission typically
does not give great weight to shipper support based on lower
freight rates"-suggesting that the applicant's ability to charge
lower prices should not be a factor in granting him or her per-
mission to compete."' And the guidelines assured that "[t]he
Commission will continue to determine whether adding another
motor carrier will adversely affect protesting carriers . . .. The antici-
pated advantage from the new service will be weighed against
actual or potential disadvantages which may impair the viability of the
transportation system"-that is, draw business away from existing
moving companies." 2
Aside from the vagueness" 3 of these protectionist criteria,
the statute fostered a cartel structure by giving existing compa-
nies the exclusive power to object to new licenses. If the CON
requirement existed to protect the public welfare, one would at
least expect that members of the public would also be entitled to
object to the issuing of a new license; yet ODOT was not required
to notify the general public of a license application, or give mem-
bers of the public any chance to object.'" Defenders of CON
requirements have contended that enlisting existing firms in this
way helps to ensure the public safety because existing firms are in
a good position to ensure that applicants are qualified."' But
their conflict of interest in doing so is too obvious for this argu-
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
113. The vagueness of these criteria is a separate ground for the unconsti-
tutionality of CON laws. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the
Supreme Court invalidated a licensing law that, through the use of vaguely
worded criteria, vested officials with essentially unbridled discretion to prevent
the opening of new businesses. Sadly, the Court has been reluctant to address
the application of the vagueness principle within the realm of business regula-
tion. See Harvey A. Silverglate & Monica R. Shah, The Degradation of the "Void for
Vagueness" Doctrine: Reversing Convictions While Saving the Unfathomable "Honest Ser-
vices Fraud" Statute, 2009-10 CATO SuP. CT. REV 201 (2010).
114. OR. REv. STAT. § 825.110(1) (2009).
115. See, e.g. Motion to Dismiss at 6, Munie v. Skouby, No. 4:10-CV-01096-
DDN, (E.D. Mo. Sept. 23, 2010) ("Defendants assert there is no better method
of insuring the consumer is able to select a 'reputable household goods mover'
than by allowing established movers, the competition, to comment upon an
applicant's fitness and ability to perform the service.").
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ment to carry any weight.' 16 Nor does it explain why members of
the general public are generally not permitted to invoke the
hearing procedure. Another common argument in support of
CON requirements for movers is that they allow the state to limit
the use of roads and preserve them from deterioration.' But
such a goal is not served in any way by requiring the licensing
agency to preserve the financial well-being of incumbent firms or
to consider other blatantly protectionist factors, when deciding
whether to grant a license. What the Supreme Court observed in
a 1925 case invalidating a protectionist CON restriction applied
equally to the Oregon statute:
Its primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety
or to conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of
competition. It determines, not the manner of use, but
the persons by whom the highways may be used. It prohib-
its such use to some persons, while permitting it to others
for the same purpose and in the same manner.' Is
Rules like the Oregon CON requirement make it expensive
and difficult for an unknown entrepreneur obtaining a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity. Imagine some penni-
less Ben Franklin, arriving unknown in Philadelphia, being
forced to obtain a CON before he can open a new printing busi-
ness. Existing printers are empowered to bar him from publish-
ing Poor Richard until he obtains permission to compete from a
group of government bureaucrats. To get permission he must
persuade a potential, future customer to take a day off of work
and testify at a hearing to prove that the state of Pennsylvania
needs a new print shop. The witness must prove that he repeat-
edly made good faith efforts to obtain printing services and con-
sistently failed; the fact that the customer is simply happier with
the services this brash young Mr. Franklin would provide is not
enough, and the rules require the government to give preference
to Franklin's established rivals. It is hard enough to believe that
this unknown printer would get his chance-but it is nearly
impossible to picture a working-class resident of the inner city, an
immigrant, a member of a minority group, or a high-school drop-
116. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) ('Every procedure
which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as ajudge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the
accused denies the latter due process of law.").
117. See Stanley v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 76, 78 (1935) (per
curiam) (upholding a Maine CON requirement purporting to safeguard its
highways for intrastate transportation).
118. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925).
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out like Sandy Meadows, having any realistic chance to obtain
permission to compete under such rules. Portland college stu-
dent Adam Sweet was fortunate that when he challenged the
Oregon mover law in a federal lawsuit, the state repealed it and
replaced the restriction with a simpler, more even-handed
requirement that applicants have certain basic levels of insurance
and a safety record."' Many would-be entrepreneurs in other
states are not so lucky.
CON requirements violate the principle of equality because
they give a privilege to politically favored insiders at the expense
of their would-be competitors-not on the basis of merit, but on
the basis of influence-and create classes of insiders and outsid-
ers. They violate publicness because they exploit government
power for private benefit without advancing the public health,
safety, and welfare; as Sir Edward Coke once said of licensing
laws, such laws pretend public benefit, but intend private.' 20 And
they violate individual liberty by depriving entrepreneurs-
America's would-be wealth-creators-of the liberty to use their
skills to pursue happiness in a way that harms nobody else.
Taken to the extreme, these restrictions systematically bar
the path of economic opportunity and entrench long-standing
patterns of wealth and poverty, and the perception, if not the
reality, of a caste system. On one hand, those who continue to
run their businesses are often driven into the underground mar-
ketplace, operating illegally without a license. 121 On the other
hand, such restrictions also break down individual values: the
idea of starting a job and working one's own way up becomes
something that one reads about but never sees happen.' 22 Social
mobility becomes something unimaginable to people who see
themselves and their neighbors denied even the means to start
what most would see as the most mundane of jobs. The society
that prided itself on freedom of opportunity and promised that a
person can rise on the basis of hard work becomes an artificial
aristocracy of political power and incumbency, where economic
success depends on personal connections and networks of influ-
ence. In turn, the culture of industry and social mobility
119. See H.B. 2817, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009), available at
http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.doc?id=31 0.
120. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 196 (1988) (quot-
ing G.G. HARRIS, TRINITY HOUSE OF DEITFORD 1515-1660, at 214 (1969)).
121. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 98.
122. See generally FED. RESERVE Sys. & BROOKINGS INST., THE ENDURING
CHALLENGE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN AMERICA: CASE STUDIES FROM COMMU-
NITIEs ACROSS THE U.S. (2008), available at http://www.frbsf.org/cpreport/
index.html.
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degenerates, and becomes divided into a class of those for whom
economic opportunity is a reality and another class, increasingly
isolated, who lack those connections, and for whom a path out of
poverty is just something that happens to other people 12 3 -a
class suffering from what sociologists call "learned helplessness,"
the acquired passivity of one who sees no point to trying to
improve one's situation.' 24 Obviously there are many different
overlapping causes of poverty. But a society that increasingly dis-
tributes economic opportunity toward entrenched interests that
already have political influence is going to become increasingly
stratified and increasingly resistant to change.' 2 ' This, in turn,
helps foster a sense of resentment and hopelessness that can lead
to social disruption and violence.126 This is what Justice Field
meant when he said that the right to earn a living free of govern-
ment favoritism is so important that if it were not "adhered to,"
the United States would be "a republic only in name."i27
III. CON RESTRICTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Serving Private Interests
As the Supreme Court recognized in Dent, licensing laws
have a dangerous potential for abuse: they can arbitrarily restrict
economic opportunity, excluding politically unpopular groups
123. See, e.g., MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CLASS 182-84
(1994) (peer groups have a powerful effect on the employment and educa-
tional choices of working-class teens).
124. See generally ERIC JENSEN, TEACHING WITH POVERTY IN MIND: WHAT
BEING POOR DoEs TO KIDS' BRAINS AND WHAT SCHOOLS CAN Do ABOUT IT 29,
113 (2009); Kenneth L. Dion, Responses to Perceived Discrimination and Relative
Deprivation, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO
SvmiIosium 159 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986); see alsojohn Mirowsky et al.,
Instrumentalism in the Land of Opportunity: Socioeconomic Causes and Emotional Con-
sequences, 59 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 322 (1996); Lois Powell, Factors Associated with the
Underrepresentation of African Americans in Mathematics and Science, 59 J. NEGRO
Enuc. 292, 294 (1990) (describing a "learned helplessness model for conceptu-
alizing the poor performance of African Americans in mathematics and science
which will show how cultural expectations of failure frequently become self-
fulfilling prophesies").
125. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
126. See, e.g., Calvin C. Johnson & Chanchalat Chanhatasilpa, The Race/
Ethnicity and Poverty Nexus of Violent Crime: Reconciling Dzfferences in Chicago's Com-
munity Area Homicide Rates, in VIOLENT CRIME: ASSESSING RACE AND ETHNIC DIF-
FERENCEs 89 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 2003); Steven F. Messner & ScottJ. South,
Economic Deprivation, Opportunity Structure, and Robbery Victimization: Intra- and
Interracial Patterns, 64 Soc. FORCES 975, 978 (1986).
127. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 110 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
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from the market for unjustifiable reasons-such as the "excessive
competition" theory-or for corrupt reasons.' 2 ' Dent made clear
that courts could help prevent such abuses by applying realistic
scrutiny to licensing standards-to ensure that they are appropri-
ate to the trade, attainable by reasonable study, and not discrimi-
natory 1 2 -and courts took relatively good care to protect
economic liberty against arbitrary licensing restrictions at first.
But the advent of "rational basis scrutiny" in the 1934 case of
Nebbia v. New York""o has encouraged courts to look the other
direction and allow legislatures to arbitrarily restrict entry into
trades and professions.
Early on, state and federal courts often regarded licensing
laws with skepticism."' For example, in a case decided the same
year as Dent, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a Detroit
ordinance that gave a city commission power to prohibit street
peddlers. This restriction, the court noted, "was simply an exer-
cise of arbitrary and unauthorized class legislation for the benefit
of a few shop-keepers, and an unjust discrimination against those
who desired to sell from carts or wagons about the village."1 12
The city could certainly regulate the sale of food in order to pro-
tect the general public, but this restriction was not a public
health regulation, because it "does not prohibit the sale of fresh
meats in the streets . . . and has no reference whatever to the
character or condition of the meat sold."'3 3 The court observed
that barriers to entry into the market were often disguised as pro-
tections for public health, but held that courts should meaning-
fully scrutinize such regulations to ensure that they were not
merely attempts to protect established firms against fair
competition:
128. See also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). The Court warned that
[a] potential conflict arises . . . whenever government delegates licens-
ing power to private parties whose economic interests may be served
by limiting the number of competitors who may engage in a particular
trade. In fact private parties have used licensing to advance their own
interests in restraining competition at the expense of the public
interest.
Id.
129. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
130. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
131. Contrary to the popular myth, however, courts during this period
upheld economic legislation more often than not. See generally DAVID N. YER,
LIBERTY OF CoNTRAcr: REDISCOVERING A LosT CONSTITUTIONAL RiGHT 84-88
(2011).
132. Chaddock v. Day, 42 N.W. 977, 978 (Mich. 1889).
133. Id.
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It is quite common in these later days for certain classes of
citizens-those engaged in this or that business-to appeal
to the government-national, state, or municipal-to aid
them by legislation against another class of citizens
engaged in the same business, but in some other way. This
class legislation, when indulged in, seldom benefits the
general public, but nearly always aids the few for whose
benefit it is enacted, not only at the expense of the few
against whom it is ostensibly directed, but also at the
expense and to the detriment of the many, for whose bene-
fit all legislation should be, in a republican form of govern-
ment, framed and devised. This kind of legislation should
receive no encouragement at the hands of the
courts . . . .134
Even the restrictions struck down in these cases, however,
bore a more plausible connection to legitimate police powers
than do CON laws, because the government at least contended
that the restriction at issue was intended to prevent unqualified
or fraudulent practitioners from entering a trade. CON restric-
tions, by contrast, do not purport to advance a public safety or
efficacy goal, or to ensure that practitioners are educated or
trained. Instead, these restrictions were designed for the sole
purpose of restricting competition regardless of quality or skill.
Such restrictions simply divide the market among a limited num-
ber of practitioners, rather than imposing any tests or proof of
proficiency.
B. CON Laws in the Supreme Court: New State Ice
Of the few Supreme Court decisions involving CON laws,
the most famous is New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 3 5 which involved
an Oklahoma law that restricted entry into the ice manufacturing
and delivery business. Unlike the laws at issue in Dent and other
cases, the Oklahoma Ice Act did not regulate the knowledge or
skills of practitioners of the trade; instead, it barred entry into
the trade unless the newcomer demonstrated to a government
commission that there was a "public need" for a new ice delivery
134. Id.
135. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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business.'"' The commission was bound to refuse a license if
existing firms were "sufficient to meet the public needs.""'
Ernest A. Liebmann had been making and delivering ice for
three decades in Texas and Oklahoma before the Ice Act was
passed.' 3 8 But when he began constructing a new ice plant with-
out first obtaining a license, two existing companies sought an
injunction to stop him. Federal district Judge John C. Pollock
refused the injunction. He had "no hesitation whatever in stat-
ing the true reason for the bringing of these suits is that plaintiffs
may further their practical monopoly of the ice business." The
existing firms were trying to veto the newcomer "because they
did not invite and do not welcome . .. competition . . . whether
[it] be beneficial to purchasers of ice . . . or not."' 3 ' Making and
selling ice was
a useful and honorable private business and calling in
which any citizen so disposed has the undoubted right
under our Constitution and laws to engage . . . [and] a
project one would believe any such young, industrious,
wide-awake growing city as Oklahoma City would welcome
with outstretched arms and glad hearts."'
While the state could regulate businesses to protect the pub-
lic-and could regulate natural monopolies, even through the
use of CON restrictions-it had no legitimate power simply to
declare by fiat that a normal, competitive industry like ice distri-
bution was a monopoly to be regulated by a CON restriction.14
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed,"' in a surprisingly
thorough decision that even included statistics demonstrating
that the law had increased the cost of ice in Oklahoma. 4 ' This
was not meant to demonstrate the economic folly of the law, but
to show that it was not an attempt to regulate the price of a
monopoly service that would otherwise be unaffordable; rather,
it was imposing an "unreasonable and unnecessary" restriction
136. In The Right to Earn a Living, supra note 6, at 142-44, I erroneously
stated that the ice commission was staffed by employees of existing firms. In
fact, the commission was staffed by government officials. The law allowed
existing firms to seek injunctions against unlicensed newcomers.
137. See Case Comment, Supreme Court Denies Right of State to Limit Competi-
tion, 34 MONTHLy LABOR REV. 1073, 1073 (1932).
138. Brief of Appellant at 15, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262 (1932) (No. 463).
139. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 42 F.2d 913, 914 (W.D. Okla. 1930).
140. Id. at 918.
141. Id. at 917.
142. Sw. Util. Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 52 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1931).
143. Id. at 355.
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on a private business by treating it as if it were a monopoly. 4
Since the business was "not a privilege in the nature of a
franchise, such as the right to maintain a public wharf, or to
operate a railroad or a street railway," but was instead "a matter
of common right open to all," there was no sense in imposing a
CON restriction on it. 1'4
The Supreme Court agreed. "[A]ll businesses are subject to
some measure of public regulation," the justices agreed, and the
government could restrict competition with public utilities and
could regulate natural monopolies.'14  But the ice business was
neither a utility nor a monopoly: it was "an ordinary business ...
as essentially private in its nature as the business of the grocer,
the dairyman, the butcher, the baker, the shoemaker, or the tai-
lor. .. .""' The state could not simply transform a normal, com-
petitive market into a public utility by ipse dixit, and use CON
restrictions to bar entrepreneurs from entering that market.
Doing so violated individual liberty without any meaningful con-
nection to protecting the general public; on the contrary, it
harmed consumers by eliminating competition that would other-
wise improve quality and drive down prices. The law's "practical
tendency" was
to shut out new enterprises, and thus create and foster
monopoly in the hands of existing establishments, against,
rather than in aid of, the interest of the consuming public.
... The aim is not to encourage competition, but to pre-
vent it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude per-
sons from engaging in it.148
But while these economic consequences were significant,
they were not the reason the Court held the law unconstitutional.
On the contrary-and despite the later caricatures of the pre-
New Deal Court as imposing the justices' idiosyncratic economic
opinions 14 -the Liebmann decision rested on a legal proposi-
144. Id. at 353.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 273 (1932).
147. Id. at 277.
148. Id. at 278-79.
149. This common canard figured prominently injustice Holmes' dissent
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) ("This case is decided upon an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain."), and
was prominent at the time that Liebmann was decided. See, e.g., Pendleton How-
ard, The Supreme Court and State Action Challenged Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
1930-1931, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 483, 485 (1932). In fact, neither the Lochner nor
Liebmann majorities rested their opinions on economic theory. See generally
HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERIAND 51-82 (1994).
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tion, and ultimately a political principle: individuals have the
right to exercise their economic freedom unless and until there
is a good reason for limiting it"'5 -and establishing a private oli-
gopoly protected by the state from fair economic competition is
not a good reason, because it violates the principles of equality,
publicness and individual liberty.' 5 '
Justice Brandeis, an outspoken advocate of the theory of
"excessive competition," wrote a dissenting opinion that has
become more famous over the years than the majority opin-
ion."' In his view, states should be free to operate as "laborato-
ries" to experiment with different legislative schemes. To impose
uniformity on the nation restricted the potential of the federalist
structure to find the most effective regulatory mechanisms.
While this notion has captured virtually all of the attention in
150. Justice Sutherland, who wrote Liebmann, made this point more
clearly in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923): "freedom of con-
tract is . . . the general rule and restraint the exception, and the exercise of
legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by the existence of excep-
tional circumstances." This is nothing more than a restatement of the staple
constitutional principle of the "presumption of liberty." See supra notes 64-65
and accompanying text. Nevertheless, progressive critics pounced on it.
According to Professor Thomas Reed Powell, "No such doctrine is stated in
the Constitution . . . . Whence, then, comes the rule that Mr. Justice Sutherland
reveals? Needless to say, it comes from Mr.Justice Sutherland. It represents his
personal views of desirable governmental policy." Thomas R. Powell, The
Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 545, 555 (1924). In
fact, as we have seen, the presumption of liberty was a staple of the American
constitutional scheme since its founding, and was a basic premise in the
thought of Locke, Sidney, Jefferson, Madison, and others, as well as being
implicit in the language of the Constitution itself. See Timothy Sandefur, Free-
dom and the Burden of Proof 10 INDEr,. REV. 139, 146 (2005).
151. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 278-79.
Plainly, a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably
curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business ...
cannot be upheld consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment ....
[I] t is beyond the power of a state, "under the guise of protecting the
public, arbitrarily [to] interfere with private business or prohibit law-
ful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions
upon them."
Stated succinctly, a private corporation here seeks to prevent a
competitor from entering the business of making and selling ice ....
There is no question now before us of any regulation . . . to protect
the consuming public .... It is not the case of a natural monopoly, or
of an enterprise in its nature dependent upon the grant of public priv-
ileges. The particular requirement before us was evidently not
imposed to prevent a practical monopoly of the business, since its ten-
dency is quite to the contrary.
Id. (quoting Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924)).
152. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 280 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice (later
ChiefJustice) Harlan Stone joined this dissent.
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subsequent years,'15  hardly anyone seems to remember Justice
153. The Supreme Court has cited Brandeis' dissent in either the major-
ity or separate opinions in 42 cases. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3095 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 3128 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 71
(2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.,
532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, 809 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
324 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
600-601 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
581 (1995) (Kennedy,J., concurring); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); W.
Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546
(1985); Id. at 567 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting); Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S.
867, 869 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 264
(1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 617 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,
77 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788
n.20 (1982) (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 773 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cmty.
Commcn's Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist,J., dissent-
ing); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 439 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 n.20 (1977); Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 376 n.16 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 312 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413
(1965) (Goldberg,J., concurring); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assemb. of Colo.,
377 U.S. 713, 752 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267, 275 (1963) (Douglas,J., concurring); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 633 (1951); Fed. Power Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488-89
(1950) (Jackson,J., dissenting); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 572 n.4 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Republic Natural Gas Co. v.
Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 96 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 n.4 (1945).
All of these opinions cited Brandeis' dissent for the proposition that states may
"experiment" with legislation. No Supreme Court opinion since World War II
has cited the majority opinion or addressed the holding of the case in any way
except for Breard, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), which cited both the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Liebmann, but relied only on the dissent. To emphasize: the
Supreme Court has never rejected Liebmann, or even discussed what the case
decided; rather, the Court has ignored the majority opinion and repeatedly
cited Brandeis' "laboratories of the states" metaphor.
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Sutherland's devastating response-states may pot "experiment"
in ways that violate constitutional rights:
It is not necessary to challenge the authority of the states to
indulge in experimental legislation; but it would be strange
and unwarranted doctrine to hold that they may do so by
enactments which transcend the limitations imposed upon
them by the federal Constitution. The principle is imbed-
ded in our constitutional system that there are certain
essentials of liberty with which the state is not entitled to
dispense in the interest of experiments.1 5 4
Sutherland noted that "[t]his principle has been applied by
this court in many cases," and followed this statement with a list
of cases, all written or joined by Justice Brandeis, in which the
Court had invalidated state laws restricting constitutionally pro-
tected liberty.'5 5 Most notably, Sutherland pointed out that in
Near v. Minnesota,'15 written by Justice Brandeis only a year ear-
lier, the Court had not allowed "the theory of experimentation in
censorship" to "interfere with the fundamental doctrine of the
freedom of the press. The opportunity to apply one's labor and
skill in an ordinary occupation with proper regard for all reason-
able regulations is no less entitled to protection."'5 7 Brandeis
did not respond to this point in his dissent.
154. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 279-80.
155. See id. In addition to Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), justice
Brandeis wrote Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924), which invalidated a state
law that prohibited labor strikes. He joined the decisions in Chas. Wolff Packing
Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (invalidating a Kansas law that
fixed wages and other prices), Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (strik-
ing down state laws prohibiting private schools), Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927) (striking down a Texas state law prohibiting blacks from voting), Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (invalidating a state law under which judges were
given a direct financial interest in convicting defendants brought before them),
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (invalidating a Georgia law under which
presidents of banks that went insolvent were presumed guilty of fraud), Wash-
ington v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (striking down an Oregon zoning law
which allowed neighbors to veto a property owner's use of land), Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Holnberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930) (striking down a state law
allowing a commission to force railroads to create special crossings even with-
out evidence that existing tracks were dangerous), and Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking down a California law that prohibited the display
of communist flags).
156. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
157. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 280.
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C. The Rise of Rational Basis Scrutiny
Liebmann has never been overruled, but the legal framework
drastically shifted two years later in Nebbia v. New York,1 ' when
the Court replaced the long-standing "affected with a public
interest" test with the theory of "rational basis scrutiny."' 59
Under this theory, states would be "free to adopt whatever eco-
nomic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public wel-
fare."" This rule did not require that the legislation actually be
reasonable in economic terms, but only that the legislation in
question be "seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legis-
lative purpose."'"' As later decisions have elaborated, this type of
scrutiny is satisfied even if there are no facts to substantiate the
purported rationality; so long as a government official could have
believed the law would accomplish some legitimate objective, that
law survives rational basis scrutiny.'62 Indeed, in FCC v. Beach
Communications,16 3 the Court pronounced the rational basis test
in the strongest terms imaginable, holding that the test presumes
a law constitutional unless a plaintiff "negative [s] every conceiva-
ble basis which might support it," and that it is "entirely irrele-
vant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason
for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legisla-
ture. . . . [T]he absence of legislative facts explaining the distinc-
tion on the record has no significance .. .. 164
Taken to its logical conclusion, this would mean the elimina-
tion of all judicial review." But the Court has never actually
158. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
159. The "affected with a public interest" test was adopted in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). Justice Field dissented in Munn, pointing out
that this test was originally devised to cover natural monopolies, and that the
grain elevators at issue in that case were not natural monopolies. See id. at
139-40 (Field, J., dissenting). Thus, as with CON restrictions themselves, we
see a theory devised to address one purported economic issue being spread
without justification to another type of market entirely.
160. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015, n.18
(1984) ("The proper inquiry before this Court is not whether the provisions in
fact will accomplish their stated objectives. Our review is limited to determin-
ing that the purpose is legitimate and that Congress rationally could have believed
that the provisions would promote that objective.") (emphasis added).
163. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
164. Id. at 315 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
165. As Justice Stevens observed, "this formulation sweeps too broadly,
for it is difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be sup-
ported by a 'reasonably conceivable state of facts.' Judicial review under the
'conceivable set of facts' test is tantamount to no review at all." Id. at 323 n.3
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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gone that far, and the relationship of the rational basis test to
economic exclusion is actually more complicated and confus-
ing.' In fact, in both Nebbia and the cases that followed soon
after, the Court indicated that the courts would still police some
limits on legislative discretion. For example, the Nebbia Court
held that economic restrictions would be held invalid "if arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the
Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and
unwarranted interference with individual liberty"' -although it
did not define these terms. Shortly thereafter, in the famous
Carolene Products footnote, the Court held that in some cases-
including those in which "discrete and insular minorities" were
singled out for legislative burdens-a higher degree of scrutiny
should apply.'6 8
What this meant for Liebmann is still unresolved. On one
hand, the law in Liebmann seems clearly to qualify as an example
of "discriminatory" regulation, which allowed politically privi-
leged insiders to bar fair competition by newcomers in the mar-
ket. Yet Justice Brandeis, at least, viewed the Oklahoma Ice Act
as a rational attempt to deal with what he perceived as the danger
of "excessive competition," and if the rational basis test indeed
requires only a potential belief on the part of a lawmaker that a
statute could remedy some perceived economic problem, the
statute in Liebmann should survive such scrutiny. In short, the
two precedents, Nebbia and Liebmann, left open-and to this day
still leave open-the question of whether the state may adopt
protectionist measures for the purpose of propping up busi-
nesses against the pressures imposed on them by free competi-
tion. Is the type of protectionism embodied in CON laws a
legitimate state interest?
Although no decision directly answered this question in the
decades after Nebbia, the Supreme Court did indicate that the
rational basis test would not allow states to use licensing laws for
the sole purpose of preventing disfavored groups or political out-
siders from entering a trade. Most notably, in the 1957 case of
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 6 s the Justices confronted a
licensing restriction it considered unjustifiable, when the state of
New Mexico prohibited any person from taking the bar examina-
tion if that person was a member of the Communist Party. The
state argued that its licensing powers included the authority to
166. See also Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Inter-
est? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 Wm. & MvY BILL RTs. J. 1023 (2006).
167. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
168. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
169. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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police the moral character of attorneys,' 7 0 a position the Court
accepted, but it held that there was no basis for finding that
Schware had bad moral character.'7 1 Instead, the state was trying
to use the licensing restriction to exclude a politically unpopular
minority from the profession of law, which was not a legitimate
use of the licensing power. The Court made clear that while a
state "can require high standards of qualification, such as good
moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an
applicant to the bar . . . any qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law."' 72
Thus even using the rational basis test, Schware reaffirmed
the rule in Dent that licensing laws must be appropriate to the
profession and attainable by reasonable study and application,
rather than being used to prevent unpopular individuals or
groups from entering a trade or profession. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit has concluded that Schware requires something more
than anything-goes rational basis scrutiny; a licensing require-
ment "must be rationally related, not merely to a legitimate state
interest, but more specifically to 'the applicant's fitness or capac-
ity to practice' the profession itself.""
Only a month after deciding Schware, the Court decided
Morey v. Doud,"' invalidating an economic regulation that dis-
criminated in favor of a single business. That case involved an
Illinois law that imposed various restrictions on the sale of money
orders, but exempted the American Express company. The
state's contention that American Express' reputation as an old
and well-respected firm justified this exception was not enough
to satisfy the rational basis test because the exemption would
remain in place even if American Express were to abandon "its
present characteristics" by engaging in abusive or wrongful activ-
ity. Meanwhile, newcomers were still forced to comply "even
though their characteristics are, or become, substantially identi-
cal with those [of] the American Express Company."' 7 5 In other
words, there was no meaningful connection between the purpose
of the law (protecting consumers) and the exception carved out
for one established firm.
170. Id. at 239.
171. Id. at 244, 246.
172. Id. at 239.
173. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Schware, 353 U.S. at 239).
174. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
175. Id. at 467.
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More significantly, the Illinois law created a CON require-
ment for money order sales establishments, and because Ameri-
can Express was exempted from this law, any new company
hoping to compete with American Express was likely to be
denied a CON and be barred from the market "because the
unregulated American Express Company had already established
outlets in the community."'77 Considering all these factors, the
Court found that the Illinois law gave a privilege to American
Express that was not warranted by any reasonable connection to
public health, safety and welfare, and was therefore unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory. While the rational basis test allows legis-
latures wide discretion to treat different businesses differently,
such "distinctions cannot be so justified if the 'discrimination has
no reasonable relation to these differences."""
Yet the Supreme Court showed little concern with such dis-
crimination in City of New Orleans v. Dukes,'78 when it overruled
Doud and upheld an ordinance that barred the sale of food from
vending carts in the French Quarter of New Orleans, but
grandfathered in existing sellers. The court of appeals had inval-
idated the ordinance as a protectionist measure that unreasona-
bly favored a single established firm. In some cases,
grandfathering existing businesses "may have a legitimate gov-
ernment rationale,"' 7 9 but that was not the case here because the
grandfather provision bore no relationship to the ordinance's
purpose. There was
simply no suggestion that eight years' experience in the
pushcart hot dog business . . . is necessary or helpful to
better hot dog salesmanship, or that it instills in the
licensed vendors (or their likely transient operators) the
kind of appreciation for the conservation of the Quarter's
tradition that would move them to refine their methods of
operation.t80
Nor did the ordinance require grandfathered sellers to
maintain the current appearance of their vending stands or stay
in the same location.' 8 ' Worse, since only a single vendor opera-
tor-Lucky Dogs, Inc.-qualified for the grandfather exception,
the ordinance was simply singling out a single vendor for special
176. Id. at 468.
177. Id. at 466 (quoting Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v.
Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 463 (1937)).
178. 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
179. Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1974).
180. Id. at 712.
181. Id. at 712 n.6.
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preference.'8 2 It "imposed economic and organizational bur-
dens" on newcomers into the market, thereby creating a
"monopoly for the favored class member."'
None of this mattered for the Supreme Court, which unani-
mously reversed. In a peculiarly extreme decision, it classified
the New Orleans ordinance as "solely an economic regula-
tion""8-as if that removed the ordinance from serious constitu-
tional concern-and followed up with a series of irrelevant or
wholly speculative justifications. For example, the city might
have "ma[de] the reasoned judgment that street peddlers and
hawkers tend to interfere with the charm and beauty of a historic
area," and might have sought to curtail them'"-a point which
was not in dispute. Rather, the question was whether the city
could enforce aesthetics laws that barred newcomers while hav-
ing grandfathered in a single existing business without imposing
any aesthetic regulations on it. To answer this, the Court
indulged in pure fantasy, imagining that the city might have
taken this as a first step toward a gradual elimination of all street
vendors,' 8 6 or that the grandfather provision was intended to
compensate Lucky Dogs for its sunk costs in hot dog vend-
ing' -a proposition that not only lacked any support in the
record, but which was irrelevant, since newcomers in a market
are more in need of such compensation than a longstanding ven-
dor that has already recouped its original investment. Yet the
Court was not satisfied to "conjure[ ] up . . . the flimsiest rea-
sons"" 8 in support of the ordinance; it also adopted these fic-
tions while consciously ignoring the actual facts in the record,
never even addressing the issues raised by the court of appeals
opinion. As one article noted shortly after the case was decided,
Dukes is "the kind of case that gives economic regulation a bad
name."'8 Indeed, it is the most extreme kind of formalism-
essentially abandoning any realistic evaluation of the facts when-
182. Id. at 712 & n.7.
183. Id. at 712-13.
184. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per
curiam); see also id. at 306 (describing the ordinance as "exclusively [an] eco-
nomic regulation").
185. Id. at 304.
186. Id. at 305.
187. Id.
188. ChristopherJ. Duerksen & Mary C. Bean, Land and the Law 1986: The
Perils of Prognostication, 18 URa. LAw. 947, 954 (1986).
189. Clifford L. Weaver & Christopher J. Duerksen, Central Business Dis-
trict Planning and the Control of Outlying Shopping Centers, 14 Umn. L. ANN. 57, 68
(1977).
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ever the government puts its legislation in the form of "solely an
economic regulation." 9 0
And yet Dukes did not overrule or discuss Schware, and it was
followed by a series of cases that invalidated economic regula-
tions discriminating against outsiders and in favor of insiders for
no legitimate purpose,' 9 ' or that invalidated other laws under
the rational basis test because they discriminated for no valid
public reason.'" In Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Ward,"' for
example, the Court struck down a state law discriminating
against insurance companies from out of state-not under the
commerce clause, which has long contained an anti-protection-
ism doctrine-but under the Fourteenth Amendment, because
the state's
aim to promote domestic industry [was] purely and com-
pletely discriminatory, designed only to favor domestic
industry within the State, no matter what the cost to for-
eign corporations also seeking to do business there . . . .
[This] constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination
that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
prevent.194
Thus the Supreme Court has never fully explained whether
economic regulations that exclude newcomers from the market
in order to protect the interests of existing firms are the sort of
arbitrary discrimination that even according to Nebbia fall outside
the bounds of the rational basis test, or whether, following Dukes,
courts should indulge in fact-free formalism to uphold such laws.
D. Protectionist Licensing Laws Today
In the past decade, lower courts have struggled with this
question in a series of cases involving protectionist occupational
licensing laws. In the Sixth Circuit case of Craigmiles v. Giles,'
the court struck down a Tennessee law that prohibited anyone
190. See, e.g., Allen D. Boyer, Samuel Williston's Struggle with Depression, 42
BUFF. L. Rv. 1, 20 (1994) ( "Existing [formalist] rules were elevated into the
category of self-evident verities .... [T] he law turned a blind eye to social and
economic concerns-thereby setting itself, deliberately or unwittingly, against
social change.").
191. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Williams
v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S.
612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
192. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
193. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
194. Id. at 878.
195. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
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but a licensed funeral director from selling coffins. This meant
that a person hoping to sell a coffin would be forced to undergo
years of training, learning skills like embalming, at the expense
of tens of thousands of dollars, even though that person was not
officiating at funerals or dealing with bodies in any way, but
wanted only to sell a box. After holding a week-long trial to
determine what relationship the law might have to protection of
public health, safety, and welfare, the district court found the law
unconstitutional,"' and the court of appeals affirmed. The
rational basis test does not allow a state to abuse its licensing laws
to establish a monopoly that bears no true connection to public
values: "protecting a discrete interest group from economic com-
petition is not a legitimate governmental purpose." 7
Shortly thereafter, however, the Tenth Circuit disagreed in a
shocking and unprecedented decision." In Powers v. Harris,"'
that court upheld a virtually identical law prohibiting the sale of
funeral merchandise by anyone who did not have a funeral direc-
tor's license. The court rejected the reasoning of Craigmiles,
holding that mere economic protectionism-even when a law
bears no connection to public health, safety, or welfare-was constitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment: "absent a violation of a
specific constitutional provision or other federal law, intrastate
economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate state inter-
est."2 o Citing to a slew of rational basis cases, the court held that
the legislature's decision to "dish[ ] out special economic bene-
fits"201 to politically influential insiders and to bar entrepreneurs
from economic opportunity was ipso facto legitimate-even if that
favor bore no connection to any public health, safety, or welfare
concern. In short, it is constitutional simply because the legisla-
ture chose to do it. The Ninth Circuit exacerbated this split of
authority in Merrifield v. Lockyer,202 when it took the side of the
Sixth Circuit. "[T]here might be instances when economic pro-
tectionism might be related to a legitimate governmental interest
and survive rational basis review," it held. "However, economic
protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to the
196. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
197. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.
198. See also Sandefur, Economic Exclusion, supra note 166, at 1033-35.
199. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
920 (2005).
200. Id. at 1221.
201. Id.
202. 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir 2008).
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common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a legiti-
mate governmental interest."203
As this history shows, even the cases applying the most leni-
ent level of scrutiny to government action have almost always
required that the government serve public-oriented goals-gener-
ally referred to as the protection of public health, safety, and wel-
fare-rather than for private interests. Almost thirty years ago,
Cass Sunstein described what he called "naked preferences": the
"distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather
than another solely on the ground that those favored have exer-
cised the raw political power to obtain what they want. "o20 Sev-
eral Constitutional provisions were written to prohibit these
exercises of arbitrary power, and to delegate to the government
the power to use coercion only on the condition that it serves the
public good. In other words, the prohibition on naked prefer-
ences is an expression of our social values of equality, publicness,
and individual liberty. The Supreme Court reinforced this pro-
position in Romer v. Evans,2 0o5 when it declared that even under
the rational basis test "we insist on knowing the relation between
the classification adopted and the object to be attained" so as to
"ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of dis-
advantaging the group burdened by the law."206
CON restrictions fail this test. At least when applied to com-
petitive industries like private moving companies, they advance
no legitimate government interest. They serve solely to disadvan-
tage the group burdened by the law and grant an advantage to
those who already enjoy the opportunity to practice their
trade.2 07 They do not protect the public from dangerous, incom-
petent, or fraudulent practitioners, and they do not-as Dent and
Schware require 20_regulate the market in a way that relates to a
person's fitness or capacity to practice the relevant trade.
Instead, such laws bar newcomers from the market regardless of
their competency or training. They foster a protectionist market
whereby private entities can prevent their own competition with
minimal public oversight. They do not ensure equality, but to
203. Id. at 991 n.15.
204. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1689.
205. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
206. Id. at 632-33.
207. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985), the
state argued that its protectionist law was not intended to burden outsiders, but
only to benefit insiders, which it claimed was a legitimate government interest.
The Supreme Court rightly rejected this as "a distinction without a difference."
208. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889); Schware v. Bd. of
Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
2012]1 423
424 NOTRE DAME ]OURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
advance the interests of insiders at the expense of outsiders.
They harm consumers, deprive entrepreneurs of the opportunity
to earn a living, and violate the fundamental values of equality,
publicness, and individual liberty embedded in our constitu-
tional and social system. They are arbitrary and discriminatory
and ought to be abolished.
Yet the major obstacle to serious reform is the murky twi-
light zone of the rational basis test, which invites courts to invent
their own justifications for challenged laws, ignore actual facts in
the record, shrug at violations of individual rights, and "cup
[their] hands over [their] eyes and then imagine if there could
be anything right with the statute."o0 The extreme language of
judicial deference used in some rational basis cases, combined
with the more serious analysis applied in others, allows courts a
scope of power that is said to be confusing to litigants and conve-
nient to judges. On one hand, facts are "irrelevant" under the
rational basis test, and plaintiffs like Adam Sweet, who want to
defend their economic freedom, are forced to undertake the
impossible task of negativing every conceivable rational basis for
the challenged law.21 o On the other hand, the rational basis test
does not allow government to enact "arbitrary" or "discrimina-
tory" restrictions, 2 1 1 and obliges courts to meaningfully review
laws to ensure that they are not used simply to exclude political
outsiders and reward insiders.' On one hand, states may regu-
late markets to grant exclusive monopolies to single businesses,
with no genuine connection to the state's asserted goals, as in
Dukes"' or Power? -but on the other, economic protectionism
is not a legitimate government interest. 215 In the Tenth Circuit,
the legislature may exploit its police powers for the sole purpose
of giving economic favors to politically favored groups without
any genuinely public justification, while in the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, government may only exercise its broad latitude to regu-
late so long as there is some sensible connection between those
regulations and the public health, safety, and welfare.
209. Arceneaux v. Treen, 671 F.2d 128, 136 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
210. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
211. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
212. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996); Ward, 470 U.S. at 878;
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1982).
213. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (per
curiam).
214. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
215. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles
v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
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This problem cannot be fixed so long as the legal commu-
nity refuses to take individual economic liberty seriously.2'1 We
would never tolerate a law that restricted the total number of
Catholics or Democrats by allowing Protestants or Republicans
the power to block any newcomers from joining these groups.
Yet because of the persistent denigration of economic liberty by
legal elites, courts refuse to extend to economic freedom the
same protection they extend to religious or expressive freedoms.
Thus entrepreneurs who wish to pursue happiness by opening a
business to provide for themselves and their families are sub-
jected to just this type of legal absurdity. The anything-goes atti-
tude that some courts have used in rational basis cases-but
which other rational basis cases have rejected-fosters legal for-
malism and ignores the way special interests exploit government
power for their own private ends.217
And that is ultimately a question of social values, not of eco-
nomic theory. Just as the Liebmann Court was concerned not
with economic theory, or the interactions of supply and demand,
but with protecting the individual liberties at the heart of the
American classical liberal constitution, so defenders of economic
liberty today are not concerned with the operation of markets,
but with the individual's right to pursue happiness-a right
courts ought to protect as an essential element of the Constitu-
tion's promise of liberty.
IV. CONCLUSION
CON laws limit economic opportunity, not to protect the
public against fraudulent or incompetent practitioners, but to
restrict competition to a level that political authorities consider
appropriate. These laws were originally devised to apply to natu-
ral monopoly or public utility markets, not to normal, competi-
tive markets like moving companies or taxicabs. The application
of such laws to these markets has serious deleterious effects in
terms of economics-but they have at least equally severe conse-
quences in terms of public mores. They do violence to the Amer-
ican Constitution's fundamental principles of equality,
216. See also Phillips, supra note 13, at 447-54.
217. See also Simpson, supra note 4, at 191:
A more serious consequence of the rational basis test is its institutional
effect. Extreme deference to legislatures prevents the courts from
enforcing constitutional limitations and places legislatures in charge
of determining the extent of their own power. This would be bad
enough in any area of life, but it is particularly problematic in the
realm of economic affairs given the obvious conflicts and temptations
that legislatures are likely to face in this area.
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publicness, and individual liberty-values that under the Consti-
tution mark the difference between genuine law and arbitrary
exercises of government power. The rational basis test that
courts use to evaluate the constitutionality of economic regula-
tions masks these problems, allowing courts to ignore their obli-
gation to enforce these values. And the damage is not only
social, but personal-it punishes our most industrious,
entrepreneurial citizens precisely for those individual values we
ought to reward. Sadly, until courts reappraise the rational basis
test, and bring some sense to the often conflicting descriptions of
that test's parameters, hardworking Americans will continue to
suffer under rules that benefit the politically influential at the
expense of those who have no political power-and who can
therefore only rely on the Constitution for protection.
